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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing all claims against 
Defendants/Respondents Dennis and Daniel Guthmiller ("Dennis" and "Daniel" respectively, 
collectively referred to as the "Guthmillers") in a personal injury action in which 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Todd, Benjamin, and Ethan Crawford (collectively the "Crawfords") failed 
to establish good cause for the failure to serve the Guthmillers within six months of filing the 
complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b )(2). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Because the Crawfords' brief fails to cite the record relied upon in formulating their 
Statement of the Case, the Guthmillers provide this background, under Idaho Appellate Rule 
35(b)(3), to clarify the course of proceedings at the trial court level. The Crawfords filed their 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 29, 2016 ("Complaint"), alleging Defendant 
Dennis was negligent while driving Defendant Daniel's vehicle on January 2, 2015, which 
resulted in personal injuries to the Crawfords. (R. 6 - 9). On the final day of the six-month 
deadline to effect service, June 29, 2017, the Crawfords filed a motion seeking an extension of 
90 days under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4( a) [sic] to serve the Guthmillers by publication or 
personal service. (R. 10). In support of their motion, the Crawfords filed the Affidavits of Joy 
Garrison and Benjamin Storer, which purport to show the Guthmillers were avoiding service. (R. 
10- 14). 
To support the assertion that the Guthmillers were avoiding service, Ms. Garrison's first 
Affidavit provides, "I personally tried to serve defendant on multiple occasions over the course 
of several months to no avail at 2484 N Hickory Way, Meridian, ID." (R. 12). On her final 
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attempt at service, on June 24, 201 7, an inhabitant of the home informed Ms. Garrison that the 
Guthmillers had not lived there, "for almost two years." (R. 12). Ms. Garrison claimed, "Despites 
[sic] several searches with various sources, I have been unable to find any other address for 
defendant other than the address where I tried to serve the summons and complaint." (R. 12). 
Similarly, Benjamin Storer, who also attempted service on multiple occasions, concluded, "All 
of my searches show that Defendants still reside there and are avoiding service." (R. 14 ). 
On July 12, 2017, the district court filed its Order Denying Motion for Order of Service 
by Publication and Extension of Time to Serve. (R. 15 - 16). The Honorable Steven Hippler 
determined the Crawfords failed to demonstrate good cause because: (1) the supporting affidavits 
did not specify when the attempts were made; (2) the supporting affidavits did not specify what 
efforts were actually taken to ascertain the correct address; and (3) the Crawfords failed to put 
forth sufficient reasons for waiting until the six month deadline to file a motion for extension of 
time. (R. 15 - 16). However, the district court allowed "Plaintiffs fourteen (14) days from the 
date of this Order to provide supplemental affidavits establishing good cause." (R. 16). 
On July 24, 2017, the Crawfords filed their Amended Motion for Order for Service by 
Publication and Extension of Time Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a) [sic]. (R. 18 - 19). Again, the 
Crawfords claimed the Guthmillers were avoiding service or had otherwise made themselves 
unavailable for service of process. (R. 18). In the Second Affidavit of Benjamin Storer, he 
identified the dates and times when he attempted personal service at the Hickory Way address -
five times between February 7, 2017, and March 5, 2017. (R. 31). Similarly, in the Second 
Affidavit of Joy Garrison, Ms. Garrison identified the dates when she attempted service - six 
times between the dates April 13, 2017, and June 24, 2017. (R. 21). In the final five days before 
the service deadline, the Crawfords made zero attempts to serve the Guthmillers. (R. 21 and R. 
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31 ). Also, Ms. Garrison states she "did searches on several address search sites prior to giving 
the Summon [sic] and Complaint to the initial process server." (R. 21). The next time Ms. 
Garrison researched the Guthmillers' address was outside the six month period for service, on 
July 24, 2017, and on the same "address search sites" she initially used. (R. 21 ). Exhibits 1 
through 4 to Ms. Garrison's Second Affidavit purport to show the the Guthmillers' address from 
the websites utilized by Ms. Garrison. (R. 21 - 29). The address search sites are 
publicwhitepages.com, familytreenow.com, and whitepages.com. (R. 21 - 29). 
On July 31 , 2017, the Guthmillers entered the case under a Notice of Special Appearance 
to seek dismissal for insufficient service of process. (R. 32 - 33). In Joy Garrison's Third 
Affidavit, attached as Exhibit 3 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, Ms. Garrison sets forth facts that the Guthmillers' insurer, State Farm, knew of the 
filed Complaint. (R. 71 - 72). On September 8, 2017, the district court held a hearing into 
whether Plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of good cause. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 6, L. 1 - 6). At the 
close of the hearing, the court invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address 
whether due diligence requires the plaintiff to do something different when initial attempts to 
serve are consistently unsuccessful. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 16, L. 17 - 25). The parties both submitted 
their supplemental briefing, and on October 18, 2017, the district court filed its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Motions to Dismiss and to Enlarge Time. (R. 91 - 97). Judge Hippler 
determined, under the totality of the circumstances, the Crawfords failed to show good cause and 
granted the Guthmillers' motion to dismiss. (R. 96). 
A Judgment dismissing the Crawfords' claims without prejudice was entered on October 
18, 2017. (R. 98). The Crawfords filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the district court on 
November 29, 2017. (R. 118). 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. What is the proper standard of review for determining whether good cause exists 
for failure to timely serve? 
B. Are Respondents Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b )(2) provides the time limit required to serve a 
defendant after the complaint is filed. It provides: 
Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 6 
months after the complaint is filed, the court, on motion or on its 
own after 14 days' notice to the plaintiff, must dismiss the action 
without prejudice against that defendant. But if the plaintiff shows 
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for 
service for an appropriate period. 
I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2). This rule is substantively very similar to the rule set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(a)(2) before July 2016. Therefore, the case law addressing the prior rule should be 
utilized to guide the Court in its interpretation and application of the current rule. 
"Rule [ 4(b )(2)] is couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does 
not comply, absent a showing of good cause." Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347, 
941 P.2d 314,319 (1997) "[T]he determination of whether good cause exists is a factual one." 
Id. at 346, 941 P.2d at 318 (citing Shaw v. Martin, 20 Idaho 168, 174-75, 117 P. 853, 855 
(1911)). Because the good cause determination is factual, and because the district court did not 
conduct an evidentiary hearing, this Court has held that the summary judgment standard is used 
in reviewing a trial court's decision that the plaintiff failed to establish good cause under LR. C.P. 
4(b)(2). Id. See also Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,288,271 P.3d 678,686 (2012). 
In an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss for untimely 
service of process, this court freely reviews the district court's 
rulings on questions of law. When reviewing a district court's 
determination of whether good cause existed to excuse the 
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untimely service of process, this Court applies the summary 
judgment standard of review, unless the district court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, in which case all reasonable inferences are 
drawn in favor of the district court's judgment. 
Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 64, 294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013) (citations omitted). As such, the 
Court "must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Sammis, 130 Idaho at 342, 941 P.2d at 
318 ( citations omitted). The burden to demonstrate good cause, however, lies with the party who 
failed to effect timely service. Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,375, 987 P.2d 284,287 (1999). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Crawfords Have Waived Their Remaining Issues by Failing to Comply with 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). 
At the outset, the Crawfords' opening brief is devoid of citations to the record or parts of 
the transcript relied upon in their appeal. In determining whether to consider issues raised on 
appeal, this Court has held: 
We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and 
authority in the opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 
524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); See also Idaho App. R. 
35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to issues presented on appeal, the reasons 
therefore, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and the record relied upon."). Regardless of whether an 
issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues 
on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not 
supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be 
considered by this Court. Inama v: Boise County ex rel. Bd. Of 
Comm 'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (refusing 
to address a constitutional takings issue when the issue was not 
· supported by legal authority and was only mentioned in passing). 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with 
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, 
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the 
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). 
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A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is 
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 
445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the 
record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. Of Prof'! Discipline, 
138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the 
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. 
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Bettweiser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013) 
(quoting Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). 
This issue is compounded when a summary judgment is at issue. "[T]he trial court is not 
required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material 
fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's 
attention." Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 Idaho 574, 582, 329 P.3d 356, 364 
(2014) (quoting Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 
854, 861 (2008)). This rule has long been recognized by many courts. As the Ninth Circuit has 
stated on this subject, 
A lawyer drafting an opposition to a summary judgment motion 
may easily show a judge, in the opposition, the evidence that the 
lawyer wants the judge to read. It is absurdly difficult for a judge 
to perform a search, unassisted by counsel, through the entire 
record, to look for such evidence. 
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Just as a party 
has an obligation to point the Court to the actual location in the record where the questions of 
fact are established during summary judgment proceedings, a party has an obligation to cite to 
the appellate record to establish the basis for their argument. I.A.R. 35(a)(6). On an appeal of a 
summary judgment motion, the same obligation to show the Court where the issues of fact exist 
as it did in the underlying case. 
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Here, the Crawfords assert the district court erred in its determination that Plaintiffs did 
not show good cause for failing to serve Defendants within the mandatory six-month period, but 
do not cite the Court to anything in the record to support their appeal issues. For instance, 
Appellants argue the district court erred in relying on information provided by Defendants in 
support of their motion to dismiss. Appellants' Brief, dated April 9, 2018, pp. 9 - 10. However, 
Appellants do not direct the Court to where the lower court relied upon this information. In fact, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate the Crawfords raised that objection in the district court. 
See Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614, 617 (2007) 
(The Idaho Supreme Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). 
With respect to the remaining issues raised in Appellants' opening brief, they provide 
only a general attack on the district court's findings and leave this Court to search the record for 
any error. Accordingly, Appellants' argument is too indefinite to be heard and should be deemed 
waived. 
B. The Standard of Review of Appeal Regarding Whether Good Cause Exists Should 
be Clarified. 
As discussed above, Idaho case law states that appellate courts review whether good 
cause exists under I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2) utilizing a summary judgment standard. This, though, is not 
clear. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, "we must liberally construe the record in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party's favor." Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997). While 
this is indeed a summary judgment standard, it is not the summary judgment standard that should 
apply to this case. As discussed above, the other option for the district court, besides a summary 
judgment motion, is to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 285, 
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271 P.3d 678, 683 (2012) (discussing the applicable standard if an evidentiary hearing is held on 
good cause). Under this procedure, the standard of review on appeal is · whether the, "findings of 
fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. 
To this end, the issue of whether good cause exists never goes to the jury. This is an issue 
that is decided only by the Court. As such, the summary judgment standard that should apply is 
not the summary judgment standard where a jury will be sitting as the trier of fact, but instead 
where the Court sits as the trier of fact. Under such circumstances, the trial court is not bound to 
give all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. 
This Court has held in the past that even though there are no 
genuine issues of material facts between the parties a motion for 
summary judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that 
conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable 
men might reach different conclusions. Such a rule is proper where 
the matter is to be tried to a jury, because even though evidentiary 
facts may be undisputed, those evidentiary facts may yield 
conflicting inferences as to what the ultimate facts of a case are. If 
such conflicting inferences are possible, then summary judgment 
would deprive the parties of the right to have the jury make the 
decision in the matter. Nevertheless, where the evidentiary facts 
are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. 
Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982) (citations and 
quotations omitted). "Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible since 
the court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial." . 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 117, 124,206 P.3d 481, 
488 (2009). In other words, where a trial judge will be sitting as the trier of fact, "the judge could 
draw those inferences which he deems most probable." Argyle v. Slemaker, l 07 Idaho 668, 670, 
691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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Under these circumstances, the trial court will be making the determinations of whether 
good cause exists. The jury, if one is requested, will never see this issue. Therefore, the statement 
of the standard of review in Sammis is not in line with Idaho law regarding summary judgment 
motions, and the Guthmillers ask the Court to recognize that Judge Hippler was allowed to make · 
inferences, which he deems most probable because the factual background of this case is not 
significantly disputed. Instead, only the ramifications of the Crawfords' actions are disputed, i.e. 
whether the actions of their attorneys constitute good cause, because there are no, "Conflicting 
evidentiary facts [that] must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party." Banner Life Ins. 
Co., 147 Idaho at 124,206 P.3d at 488. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When it Determined the Crawfords Failed to Show 
Good Cause for Failing to Serve the Summons and Complaint upon Defendants 
Within Six Months of Filing the Complaint. 
In the event this Court decides to hear and consider the Crawfords' assignments of error, . 
their arguments should still fail because the district court did not err. There is no bright line test 
for determining good cause but, rather, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 290, 271 P.3d 678, 688 (2012). To show good cause under the 
totality of the circumstances, "such party must present sworn testimony by affidavit or otherwise 
setting forth facts that show good cause for failing to serve the summons and complaint timely." 
Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 698, 302 P.3d 35, 38 (2013). The sworn testimony must 
focus on the "diligent efforts" of the party and "circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control." 
Elliot, 152 Idaho at 280,271 P.3d at 688. Diligent efforts generally include efforts to (1) "locate 
the [defendants]," and (2) "to ascertain how ... [to] serve them. Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347, 941 
P.3d at 319. Interpreting a substantially similar service rule, federal courts caution, "The lesson 
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to the federal plaintiffs lawyer is not to take any chances. Treat the 120 days1 with the respect 
reserved for a time bomb." Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (3rd Cir. 
1995) (quoting Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238,241 (3rd Cir. 1987)). 
The Crawfords rely on Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 987 P.2d 284 (1999), for the 
proposition that, because they did not wait until a week before the six-month deadline to begin 
efforts to serve, then their efforts in this case were diligent. In Martin, the plaintiff waited until 
eleven days before the service deadline to deliver the complaint to the sheriff for personal 
service. Id. at 377, 987 P.2d at 289. However, by the time the sheriff attempted service, it was 
discovered the defendant had moved out of the state so the plaintiff was unable to serve the 
complaint and summons within the six-month mandatory deadline. Id. The Court, after holding 
settlement negotiations are irrelevant to a good cause determination, reasoned that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff could not reasonably be viewed as diligent in 
"counsel's single timely act of forwarding the summons and complaint to the sheriff .... " Id. at 
377, 987 P.2d at 289. To this end, Martin holds that courts may consider, as part of the totality of 
the circumstances, how long the plaintiff waited before attempting service. See also Rudd v. 
Merrit, 138 Idaho 526, 532, 66 P.3d 230, 236 (2003) ("Waiting five and three-fourths months 
before attempting to effect service does not show due diligence."). Delay in attempted service, 
however, is merely one consideration for a due diligence determination. 
A diligent search should not be measured by the quantity of the search, but the quality. A 
review of other states' due diligence boundaries helps establish whether the Crawfords exercised 
due diligence in trying to locate Defendants' whereabouts. See Sammis, supra, 130 Idaho 342, 
1 The time limit set for service under former versions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which in its current 
form, has a time limit of 90 days. 
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941 P.2d 314 (relying on federal case law to interpret previous I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2)); Hammer v. 
Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 401 P.3d 148, 153 (2017) ("We prefer to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure in conformance with interpretations of the same language in the federal rules."). In 
Abreu v. Gilmer, the Nevada Supreme Court said: 
[T]here is no objective, formulaic standard for determining what is, 
or is not, due diligence. The due diligence requirement is not 
quantifiable by reference to the number of service attempts or 
inquires into public records. Instead, due diligence is measured by 
the qualitative efforts of a specific plaintiff seeking to locate and 
serve a specific defendant. 
Abreu v. Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999) (Nev.R.Civ.P. 4(i) permits 120 days 
for service of summons and complaint). In determining the outer limits of due diligence, the 
Washington Court of Appeals held "that a plaintiff need not exhaust all conceivable means of 
personal service before service by publication is authorized. A plaintiff need only follow up on 
that information possessed by plaintiff which might reasonably assist in determining defendant's 
whereabouts." Carson v. Northstar Development Co., 62 Wash. App. 310, 814 P.2d 217, 221 
(1991) (citations omitted). This requires that reasonably available information be followed up on. 
See Petru Kott v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.App.41h 1126, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 221 (Cal. 1996) 
("[L]ikely sources of information . .. must be searched before resorting to service by 
publication."); Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1307 ("A prudent attorney exercising reasonable care and 
diligence would have inquired into the matter further when it was obvious that the 
acknowledgment form was not forthcoming.") (Interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) - 120 days after 
filing of the complaint); Southeast & Assocs. , Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 704 
So.2d 694, 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The plaintiff has the burden of showing that it 
reasonably employed the knowledge at its command, made diligent inquiry, and exerted an 
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honest and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstances to acquire the information 
necessary to serve the defendant personally."). 
In this case, the trial comi correctly viewed the diligence issues as, not one of delay in 
attempted service, but whether a diligent attorney can continue to rely on outdated public address 
websites after multiple attempts at service at a single address have failed . In making its · 
determination, the district court properly made its decision based on the facts as presented in the 
the Crawfords' affidavits. (R. 91 - 96). From those affidavits, the Crawfords' eff01is to locate the 
Guthmillers fell well below what is generally required to constitute due diligence. See Sammis, 
130 Idaho at 347, 941 P.3d at 319. The Crawfords' location efforts consisted of address searches 
on unreliable sources, such as publicwhitepages.com, familytreenow.com, and whitepages.com. 
It is undisputed these searches only took place once within the six-month service period - before 
giving the Summons and Complaint to the initial process server, Benjamin Storer. (R. 21 - 29). 
The next time the Crawfords searched for Guthmillers' location was after the six-month period to 
serve. (R. 21). It is further undisputed that the Crawfords attempted service only at the Hickory 
Way address. The record is empty as to any attempts to re-check whether the Crawfords had the 
correct address, despite multiple failed service attempts and an obvious lead from a resident of 
the home informing Ms. Garrison the the Guthmillers had not resided there for nearly two years. 
The fact the Crawfords attempted service 11 times at a single address is not determinative 
of whether they were diligent. Rather, viewing the totality of the circumstances; the Crawfords' 
attempts to locate and serve the Guthmillers were shallow. A diligent attorney, after multiple 
failed attempts at a single address, should take reasonable additional steps to locate or confom 
the Guthmillers' whereabouts. This is particularly true when the statute of limitations had 
expired for two out of the three plaintiffs. See Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 15\ 156 (7th Cir. 
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1996) ("An attorney who files suit when the statute of limitations is about to expire must take 
special care to achieve timely service of process, because a slip up is fatal. ") (Interpreting 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)). Then, five days before the final day to serve, the Crawfords were informed 
that the Guthmillers did not in fact live at the Hickory Way address. Instead of following up on 
this obvious lead, it appears Plaintiffs ignored it and jumped to the conclusion, without any 
further research, that the Guthmillers were evading service. In fact, the final five days of the 
service period do not reflect any efforts whatsoever to effect service before the deadline. Instead, 
· the Crawfords filed a motion to extend time on the final day. A motion that itself requires good 
cause cannot be the saving grace to establish good cause for failure to serve. 
Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the Crawfords failed to 
show good cause for not effectuating service in the six-month service period. The Crawfords 
were not diligent when they remained content with the public address searches performed prior 
to the first attempt at service, despite many failed attempts and being told the Guthmillers did not 
reside at that address. 
D. Respondents are Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Respondents request an award of costs and fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code § 12-121 . An award of attorney fees is appropriate if this Court 
finds that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Kirkham v. 
Stoker, 134 Idaho 541 , 546, 6 P.3d 397, 402 (2000); Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 449, 797 
P.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, Appellants generally challenge the trial court's findings without any support 
in the record. There is no basis, in law or fact, for this Court to conclude that the district court 
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improperly determined Plaintiffs failed to show good cause. Therefore, Respondents qualify to 
receive an award of attorney fees under section 12-121. 
E. Appellants are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Appellants ask the Court to award them attorney fees on appeal. Appellants ' Brief, dated 
April 9, 2018, pp. 12 - 13. First and foremost, Appellants cite the incorrect standard for attorney 
fees. The ''justice so requires" standard set forth by the Court in Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 
868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696 (2016), never took effect on March 1, 2017, because: 
In the interim, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code section 
12-121 to mirror the language of the previous Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54( e )( 1 ), with the express purpose of reinstating the law 
as it existed prior to Hoffer. 2017 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 47, §§ 1, 2, p. 
75-76. Idaho Code section 12-121 now provides that: "[i]n any 
civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." LC. § 12-121. 
Regan v. Owen, 2014 WL 3927024, at *8 (Idaho Sept. 8, 2017). 
Nonetheless, Idaho Code section 12-121 only allows a "prevailing party" to obtain 
attorney fees . In determining who is the prevailing party for purposes of costs, the prevailing 
party analysis includes consideration of, "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Unlike Respondents where 
affirmance would result in a dismissal of the underlying action, the best case scenario for 
Appellants would result in a remand to the district court. Until that remand is resolved, it would 
be impossible to determine who the prevailing party on an overall basis was. In Cox v. City of 
Sandpoint, after a summary judgment order was vacated and the case was remanded, the Court 
of Appeals states, 
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Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. Cox is 
the prevailing party on appeal but it remains to be seen whether 
Cox is the prevailing party in the action, and, therefore, entitled to 
attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 41. The district 
court, upon final resolution of the case, may consider fees incurred 
on appeal when it makes an award to the prevailing party. 
Cox v. City of Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 133, 90 P.3d 352, 358 (Ct. App. 2003). In this case, a 
similar result should occur. Because a prevailing party must be determined, and Appellants 
cannot be a prevailing party on an overall basis as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(B) until the case reaches a resolution, Appellants should not be awarded fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Guthmillers respectfully request this Court affirm the 
district court' s Decision and Order on Motions to Dismiss and To Enlarge Time, and the court's 
Judgment. The Guthmillers also respectfully request this Court award attorneys' fees incurred in 
responding to this appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of May 2018. 
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